Licensing Cost-Reducing Innovations Under Supply Function Competition by Saglam, Ismail
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Licensing Cost-Reducing Innovations
Under Supply Function Competition
Saglam, Ismail
TOBB University of Economics and Technology
20 April 2021
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/107293/
MPRA Paper No. 107293, posted 21 Apr 2021 07:02 UTC
Licensing Cost-Reducing Innovations
Under Supply Function Competition
Ismail Saglam✯
Department of Economics, TOBB University of Economics and Technology
Sogutozu Cad. No:43, Sogutozu, 06560, Ankara, Turkey
Abstract. In this paper, we study the problem of licensing cost-reducing
innovations in a duopoly under supply function competition. We show that
the innovator prefers fixed-fee licensing to no licensing if its cost advantage is
not extremely large. Moreover, if its cost advantage is not extremely small,
the innovator prefers fixed-fee licensing to royalty licensing, as well.
Keywords: Duopoly; licensing; supply function competition.
JEL Codes: D43; L13; O30
1 Introduction
In this paper, we study licensing of (cost-reducing) innovations in a duopoly
under supply function competitions. Licensing of innovations has been ex-
tensively studied under quantity and price competitions both when the in-
novator is an outsider, an R&D organization that does not compete in the
product market, and when it is an insider, one of the producers. In the
first case, the licensor generally prefers fixed-fee licensing to royalty licensing
(e.g., Kamien and Tauman, 1986; Katz and Shapiro, 1986; Kamien et al.,
✯The author has no conflicts of interests to declare. The usual disclaimer applies.
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1992), whereas in the second case the reverse is true: the licensor, as an
insider, generally finds royalty licensing superior (e.g., Wang, 1998; Wang
and Yang 1999; Kamien and Tauman, 2002; Filippini, 2005; and San Martin
and Saracho, 2010). The second result was also checked, by a vast literature,
to be robust to many modeling variations including asymmetric information,
leadership structure, moral hazard, product differentiation, quality variation,
risk aversion, and strategic delegation.1 Yet, these variations leave out an
important issue, namely licensing under supply function competition where
firms non-cooperatively choose supply functions instead of fixed quantities
or prices. This relatively new form of competition, formulated by Grossman
(1981) and developed by Klemperer and Meyer (1989), has found many ap-
plications in the last three decades especially in electricity markets (Green
and Newbery 1992, Rudkevich and Duckworth 1998, Day et al. 2002, New-
bery and Greve 2017, Escrihuela-Villar et al. 2020) where it is also known
that innovation is essential, as indicated by European Commission (2015),
to maintain leadership in the industry as well as to boost jobs and economic
growth.
We believe that our paper is the first attempt to integrate technology
licensing with supply function competition. Formally, our model involves a
duopolistic industry where one of the firms has an (unrivaled) cost-reducing
innovation. We are not interested in the development of this innovation and
also assume that its efficiency is common knowledge. We consider two licens-
ing arrangements, one involving fixed-fees and the other involving ad valorem
royalties (per revenue units).2 Empirical studies on technology licensing re-
port the frequent use of royalties, and especially ad valorem royalties. Ros-
1See Sen (2005) for a classified list of papers on these issues.
2There are also other types of licensing arrangements such as per unit royalty licensing
and two-part tariff licensing that combines fixed fees with either per-unit or ad valorem
royalties. which are beyond the scope of this paper.
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toker (1984) reports using survey data from randomly selected 150 corpora-
tions in the United States that royalties and fees are separately used in 39%
and 13% of all transactions respectively. Bousquet et al. (1998) show using
French data that in a sample of 278 contracts, 225 (81%) includes royalties of
which 216 (96%) are ad valorem. Vishwasrao (2007) shows that patent licen-
sors are empirically more likely to ask for royalties when sales are relatively
high and involatile but profits are low. Theoretically, it is well-known that
under quantity or price competition the licensor has an additional incentive
to use (per-unit or ad valorem) royalties since they raise the effective cost
of the licensee (see, for example, Wang, 1998, Kamien and Tauman, 2002).
We will investigate whether this incentive continues to exist under supply
function competition with the help of a three-stage (non-cooperative) game
played by the duopolists. In the first stage, the innovator (licensor) makes
a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer to its competitor (licensee) for its cost-reducing
technology, and in the second stage the licensee decides whether to accept
or reject the offer (or equivalently whether to produce at equal or unequal
costs). Given this decision and the implied cost structure, the two firms fi-
nally engage in supply function competition in the third stage. Calculating
the subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game we show that the innovator
prefers fixed-fee licensing to no licensing if and only if its cost advantage
is not extremely high. Moreover, if this cost advantage is mild, it prefers
fixed-fee licensing to royalty licensing, too. Thus, royalty licensing becomes
a preferred arrangement of licensing for the innovator only if the size of its
innovation and its effect on profits is very minor.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 involves some basic
structures and Section 3 presents for each licensing arrangement a strategic
game played by duopolists under supply function competition along with
its equilibrium. In more detail, Section 3.1 deals with royalty licensing and
Section 3.2 with fixed-fee licensing. Next, section 4 contains our welfare
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results and finally Section 5 concludes.
2 Basic Structures
We consider a duopolistic industry where a single homogeneous good is pro-
duced under cost asymmetry. The demand curve faced by the firms is given
by
D(p) = a− p, (1)
where a > 0 denotes the constant intercept and p denotes the product price.




where qi is the quantity produced by firm i and θi is a non-negative con-
stant that is equal to the marginal cost of the unit output. (Fixed costs are
normalized to zero to simplify the analysis.) We assume that firm 1 (innova-
tor) has a superior and unrivaled production technology that yields an initial
cost advantage. Specifically, the cost parameters of firm 1 and firm 2 are
θ1 = θ − x and θ2 = θ where 0 < θ < a and 0 < x ≤ θ. In this paper, we
are not interested in the development of innovation (i.e., determination of
the parameter x). The value of x, a, θ, θ1, and θ2 are exogenously given. We
also assume that both firms are rational (profit maximizers) and the industry
structure described above is common knowledge.
We consider two arrangements of licensing. One of them is fixed fee licens-
ing in which firm 1 demands a fixed fee from firm 2. The other arrangement
is ad valorem royalty licensing in which firm 1 demands from firm 2 a frac-
tion of its revenues. Under both arrangements, once an agreement is reached
firm 1 makes its superior technology be accessible to firm 2, enabling it to
produce using the cost parameter θ − x instead of θ.
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3 Licensing Game
We consider a strategic game consisting of three stages. In the first stage,
the licensor (firm 1) makes a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer to the licensee (firm
2), and in the second stage the licensee decides whether to accept or reject
the offer. We assume that the licensee always accepts an offer whenever it
becomes indifferent to accept or reject. After the licensee makes its decision,
production costs become finalized and common knowledge, and finally the
firms engage in supply function competition in the third stage.
3.1 Royalty Licensing
We assume that firm 1 offers to firm 2 the license for its innovation in return
for a royalty payment, defined as a share of the revenues of firm 2, i.e. r p q2
where r ∈ R+ is called the royalty rate. (Note that no offer with r > 1 can
be acceptable for firm 2. Thus, by allowing firm 1 to make an offer with
r > 1, we actually allow for the possibility that firm 1 does not want to sell
its innovation.) After learning the royalty rate demanded by firm 1, firm 2
decides whether or not to buy the license (to accept the offer of firm 1). Let
γR ∈ {0, 1} represent this decision, where γR = 1 and γR = 0 respectively
denote ‘to buy’ and ‘not to buy’ the license sold by firm 1. If γR = 1, then
the cost parameters of the two firms become equivalent at θ− x. Otherwise,
the cost parameters of firms 1 and 2 will be θ − x and θ respectively. After
the decision and cost parameter of firm 2 have been realized and become
common knowledge, firm 1 and firm 2 engage in supply competition. More
formally, the two firms play the following non-cooperative game involving
three consecutive stages:
Stage 1: Firm 1 decides on the value of r and offers to firm 2 that it will
license its innovation in return for a royalty payment of amount rpq2.
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Stage 2: Firm 2 decides on the value of γR, i.e., whether or not it accepts
the offer of firm 1, and announces it.
Stage 3: Firm 1 and Firm 2 engage in supply function competition with
cost parameters θ − x and θ − γRx respectively and then a royalty fee of
γRrpq2 is paid by firm 2 to firm 1. (Note that the royalty fee becomes zero
and firm 2 produces with parameter θ when γ = 0.)
Below, we will solve for the equilibrium of the game described above. Us-
ing subgame-perfection we will start from the last stage.
Stage 3: Firms simultaneously choose their supply functions.
In stage 3, a strategy for firm i ∈ {1, 2} is a linear function mapping prices
into quantities, i.e., SRi (p) = ν
R
i p where ν
R
i ≥ 0. Given the strategies S
R
1 (p)
and SR2 (p), the duopolistic product market clears if




a− p = νR1 p+ ν
R
2 p, (4)
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(The superscript R appearing in πR1 and π
R
2 , as well as in some variables,
stands for royalty licensing.) Given any r ∈ R+ and γ
R ∈ {0, 1}, the sup-
ply functions SR∗1 (p) = ν
R∗
1 (r, γ
R)p and SR∗2 (p) = ν
R∗
2 (r, γ
R)p form a Nash








j , r, γ
R) (8)
for each i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j.
Proposition 1. For any r ∈ R+ and γ ∈ {0, 1}, the supply function com-
petition under royalty licensing has always a unique Nash equilibrium where
firm 1 and firm 2 respectively compete with supply functions νR∗1 (r, γ)p and










































c2 = −(θ1 + 2), (16)
θR2 = θ − γ
Rx = θ1 + (1− γ
R)x. (17)
Proof. Pick any r ∈ R+ and γ
R ∈ {0, 1}. Let θR2 = θ−γ
Rx = θ1+(1−γ
R)x.
If the pair of supply functions SR1 (p) = ν
R
1 (r, γ
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/2− γRrpSR2 (p). (19)
The first-order necessary condition for the problem in (18) implies
0 = a− bp− SR2 (p) + γ
Rr
(

















0 = SR1 (p) + 2γ






= (νR1 + 2γ









1 + (1− 2γRr)νR2
1 + θ1(1 + νR2 )
. (22)
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On the other hand, the first-order necessary condition for the problem in
(19) implies
0 = a− bp− SR1 (p)− γ
















0 = SR2 (p)− 2γ






































Solving (22) and (26) together yields (9)-(17). To check the second-order
sufficiency condition, we differentiate the right-hand side of (21) with respect














which is always equal to zero (hence nonpositive) by (22). Similarly, we














which is always equal to zero (hence nonpositive) by (25). 
Stage 2: Firm 2 chooses γR ∈ {0, 1}; i.e., whether or not to buy the
royalty license.
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The choice of firm 2 on γR depends on the comparison of its stage-3 profits
obtained under the supply function competition when it decides to buy the
license (γR = 1) and when it decides not to buy it (γR = 0). Proposition 1
implies that if γR = 0, the firms’ profits will be πR1 (ν
R∗
1 (r, 0), ν
R∗
2 (r, 0), r, 0)
and πR2 (ν
R∗
1 (r, 0), ν
R∗
2 (r, 0), r, 0) for any r ∈ R+. On the other hand, if γ
R =
1, the firms’ profits will be πR1 (ν
R∗
1 (r, 1), ν
R∗





νR∗2 (r, 1), r, 1). For any i ∈ {1, 2} and r ∈ R+, let ∆π
R∗
i (r) denote the
difference between the profits of firm i obtained under γR = 1 and γR = 0:




1 (r, 1), ν
R∗




1 (r, 0), ν
R∗
2 (r, 0), r, 0).(29)
Also, let γR∗(r) denote the optimal choice made by firm 2 at r ∈ R+. Since
firm 2 is rational, we must have
γR∗(r) =
{
1 if ∆πR∗2 (r) ≥ 0,
0 otherwise.
(30)
Note from (7) and (29) that ∆πR∗2 (r) is decreasing for all r ∈ R+, as we have
∂∆πR∗2 (r)/∂r = −p(ν
R∗
1 (r, 1), ν
R∗
2 (r, 1))
2 νR∗2 (r, 1)) < 0. (31)
We will use this observation to prove the following result.
Proposition 2. There exists r̄ ∈ R+ such that ∆π
R∗
2 (r̄) = 0. Moreover, r̄ is
unique and lies in (0, 1).
Proof. Note from (7) that πR2 (ν
R∗
1 (r, γ
R), νR∗2 (r, γ
R), r, γR) is decreasing in
θR2 = θ− γ
Rx, while θR2 is decreasing in γ
R. So, when the license of firm 1 is
free, i.e., r = 0, πR2 is increasing in γ
R, implying ∆πR∗2 (0) > 0. On the other
hand, when the license of firm 1 is too costly for firm 2, i.e. r ≥ 1, (7) implies
that the profit of firm 2 is negative when it buys the license (i.e., γR = 1). In
contrast, when firm 2 decides not to buy the license (i.e., γR = 0), its profit




continuous in r, there exists r̄ ∈ (0, 1) such that ∆πR∗2 (r̄) = 0. Moreover, r̄
is unique since (31) implies that ∆πR∗2 (r) is decreasing for all r ∈ (0, 1). 




1 if r ≤ r̄,
0 if r > r̄,
(32)
where r̄ is the unique solution to ∆πR∗2 (r) = 0.
Stage 1: Firm 1 chooses the royalty rate r ∈ R+.
The profit of firm 1 in (6) is increasing in the royalty rate r by the envelope
function theorem if γR = 1 and independent of r if γR = 0. On the other
hand, equation (32) shows that firm 2 accepts to pay a royalty at rate r if and
only if r ≤ r̄. Therefore, if firm 1 decides to sell the license for its innovation,
then it must set the royalty rate at r̄. Recall that firm 2 does not buy the
license when r ≥ 1. So, for any r ≥ 1 the profit of firm 1 becomes equivalent
to its profit at r = 1. So, firm 1 decides not to sell the license if and only if
it obtains a lower profit at the royalty rate r = r̄ (implying γR∗(r) = 1) than
at the rate r = 1 (implying γR∗(r) = 0). Thus, the optimal royalty rate r∗





{r̄} if ∆πR∗1 (r̄) ≥ 0,
[1,∞) otherwise.
(33)
Note that r∗ is not unique when ∆πR∗1 (r̄) < 0, however each value of r
∗ in
[1,∞) leads to the same response by firm 2, i.e. γR∗(r∗) = 0 for all r∗ ≥ 1. In
other words, r∗ is essentially unique. Considering the equilibrium strategies
played in all three stages together, we observe the following.
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Proposition 3. The rate of royalty r∗ chosen by firm 1, the decision plan
γR∗(r) of firm 2 for each r ∈ R+, and the contingent supply functions
νR∗1 (r, γ
R)p and νR∗2 (r, γ
R)p of firms 1 and 2 for each r ∈ R+ and γ
R ∈ {0, 1}
altogether form the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the three-stage game
under royalty licensing.
Proof. Follows from (9)-(17), (32), and (33). 
3.2 Fixed-Fee Licensing
Here, we assume that firm 1 offers to firm 2 the license for its innovation
in return for a fixed fee F ∈ R+. After learning the value of F asked by
firm 1, firm 2 decides whether to buy the license or not. Let γF ∈ {0, 1}
represent this decision of firm 2. (We add the superscript F to variables in
this subsection to denote that they are associated with fixed fee licensing.)
Specifically, γF = 1 and γF = 0 respectively denote the decisions ‘to buy’
and ‘not to buy’ the fixed fee license sold by firm 1. If γF = 1, then the
cost parameters of the two firms become equivalent at θ − x. Otherwise,
the cost parameters of firms 1 and 2 will be θ − x and θ respectively. After
the decision and cost parameter of firm 2 have been realized and become
common knowledge, firm 1 and firm 2 engage in supply competition. More
formally, the two firms play the following non-cooperative game involving
three consecutive stages:
Stage 1: Firm 1 decides on the value of F (in the units of profits) and
announces that it will sell to firm 2 the license for its innovation in return
for a payment of amount F .
Stage 2: Firm 2 decides on the value of γF , i.e., whether or not it accepts
the offer of firm 1, and announces it.
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Stage 3: Firm 1 and Firm 2 engage in supply function competition with
cost parameters θ1 = θ − x and θ
F
2 = θ − γ
Fx respectively and choose
their equilibrium supply functions. After the productions are realized, the
licensing fee of amount γFF is paid by firm 2 to firm 1.
Below, we will solve for the equilibrium of the above game. Using subgame-
perfection we will start from the last stage.
Stage 3: Firms simultaneously choose their supply functions.
Given any F ∈ R+ and γ
F ∈ {0, 1}, let vF∗1 (F, γ
F )p and vF∗2 (F, γ
F ) respec-
tively denote the equilibrium supply functions of firm 1 and firm 2 under





F ), vF∗2 (F, γ
F ), F, γF ) = γFF + vF∗1 (F, γ
F )p






F ), vF∗2 (F, γ
F ), F, γF ) = −γFF + vF∗2 (F, γ
F )p
−(θ − γFx)vF∗2 (F, γ
F )2p2/2 (35)
for any F ∈ R+ and γ
F ∈ {0, 1}. Recalling that under royalty licensing the
equilibrium supply functions of firm 1 and firm 2 are respectively νR∗1 (r, γ
R)p
and νR∗2 (r, γ
R)p which are implied by (9)-(17) for any r ∈ R+ and γ
R ∈
{0, 1}, and also noting that the term γFF in (34) and (35) is constant with
respect to the output choices of the firms, we trivially obtain the slopes of
the equilibrium supply functions under fixed fee licensing by the equations
νF∗1 (F, γ




F ) = νR∗2 (0, γ
F ) (37)
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for any F ∈ R+ and γ
F ∈ {0, 1}. That is, by inserting r = 0 and γR = γF
into (9)-(17), we can obtain νF∗1 (F, γ
F ) and νF∗2 (F, γ
F ) for any F ∈ R+.
Stage 2: Firm 2 chooses γF ∈ {0, 1}; i.e., whether or not to buy the
fixed fee license.
The choice of firm 2 on γF depends on the comparison of its stage-3 profits
obtained under the supply function competition when it decides to buy the
license (γF = 1) and when it decides not to buy it (γF = 0). For any F ∈ R+,
equations (34) and (35) imply that if γF = 0, the profit of firm 2 will become
πF2 (ν
F∗
1 (0, 0), ν
F∗
2 (0, 0), F, 0). On the other hand, if γ
F = 1, firm 2 will earn
πF2 (ν
F∗
1 (0, 1), ν
F∗
2 (0, 1), F, 1). For any i ∈ {1, 2}, let ∆π
F∗
i (F ) denote the
difference between the profits of firm i obtained under γF = 1 and γF = 0;
i.e.,




1 (0, 1), ν
F∗




1 (0, 0), ν
F∗
2 (0, 0), F, 0).(38)
Also, let γF∗(F ) denote the optimal decision of firm 2 when firm 1 demands
a fee of F ∈ R+. As firm 2 is rational, we have
γF∗(F ) =
{
1 if ∆πF∗2 (F ) ≥ 0,
0 otherwise.
(39)
Note that using (38) for i = 2 and (7), we obtain
∂∆πF∗2 (F )/∂F = −1, (40)
implying that ∆πF∗2 (F ) is decreasing for all F ∈ R+. We use this observation
to prove the following result.
Proposition 4. There exists F̄ ∈ R+ such that ∆π
F∗
2 (F̄ ) = 0. Moreover, F̄
is unique and equal to ∆πF∗2 (0).
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Proof. Using (38) for i = 2 along with (37) we obtain ∆πF∗2 (F ) =
∆πF∗2 (0) − F , implying that ∆π
F∗
2 (F̄ ) = 0 if F̄ = ∆π
F∗
2 (0). Also, we know
from (40) that ∂∆πF∗2 (F )/∂F < 0 for all F ∈ R+. Therefore, F̄ must be
unique. 




1 if F ≤ F̄ ,
0 if F > F̄ .
(41)
Stage 1: Firm 1 chooses the fixed fee F ∈ R+.
Equation (34) shows that the profit of firm 1 under fixed fee licensing is
increasing in the fixed fee F if γF = 1 and independent of F if γF = 0. On
the other hand, equation (41) shows that firm 2 accepts to buy the license
with fixed fee F if and only if F ≤ F̄ . Therefore, if firm 1 decides to sell
the license for its innovation, then it must set the fixed fee at F̄ . Also, recall
that firm 1 cannot sell its license to firm 2 (γF∗(F ) = 0) when F > F̄ . So,
firm 1 decides not to sell the license if and only if it obtains a lower profit
at the fixed fee F = F̄ (implying γF∗(F ) = 1) than at any F > F̄ (implying






{F̄} if ∆πF∗1 (F̄ ) ≥ 0,
(F̄ ,∞) otherwise.
(42)
Note that F ∗ is not unique when ∆πF∗1 (F̄ ) < 0; however each value of F
∗ in
(F̄ ,∞) induces the same response by firm 2, i.e. γF∗(F ∗) = 0 for all F ∗ > F̄ .
Thus, the equilibria we have characterized above is essentially unique. Con-
sidering the equilibrium strategies in all three stages together, we have the
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following result:
Proposition 5. The fixed fee F ∗ chosen by firm 1, the decision plan γF∗(F )




and νF∗2 (F, γ
F )p of firms 1 and 2 for each F ∈ R+ and γ
F ∈ {0, 1} al-
together form the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the three-stage game
under fixed fee licensing.
Proof. Follows from (36), (37), (41), and (42). 
4 Welfare Analysis
In this section, we ask the following questions: Is fixed fee licensing or royalty-
licensing always beneficial for consumers? Does the innovator always prefer
to sell the license for its superior technology under any arrangement of licens-
ing or could it be better off keeping its innovation to itself? If licensing ever
becomes optimal for firm 1, which arrangement would it prefer? To answer
the first of these questions, we have to find how consumers’ surplus is affected
by licensing. As the two forms of licensing affect the supply functions differ-
ently, let us first consider the easier case of fixed fee licensing. As we have
seen in equations (36) and (37), the supply function equilibrium under fixed
fee licensing can be obtained from the equilibrium under royalty licensing by
setting the royalty rate to zero. Correspondingly, the reaction functions of
firm 1 and firm 2 under fixed fee licensing can be obtained, under the setting

















respectively. Figure 1 plots these reaction functions and the equilibrium
slopes νF∗1 and ν
F∗
































Figure 1. The Slopes of Equilibrium Supply Functions Under
Fixed-Fee Licensing
Recall that the cost parameter of firm 2 is θF2 = θ−γ
Fx, which is increas-
ing in γF ∈ {0, 1}. So, the horizontal lines at 1/(1+θF2 ) and 1/θ
F
2 would each
be drawn at a higher level if γF = 1 than if γF = 0, and consequently the
blue-colored reaction curve of firm 2, νF2 (ν
F
1 ), would be at a higher position
if γF = 1. This implies the following remark.
Remark 1. The slopes νF∗1 and ν
F∗
2 always attain a higher level when firm
2 buys the license sold by firm 1 at any fixed fee than when firm 2 does not
buy the license.
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Remark 1 has an implication on the equilibrium industry output and con-
sumers’ surplus under fixed fee licensing.
Proposition 6. The equilibrium industry output and consumers’ surplus
are always higher under fixed fee licensing than under no licensing.
Proof. Note that price p∗ clears the product market under fixed fee li-
censing if D(p∗) = SF1 (p
∗) + SF2 (p
∗) or a − p∗ = νF1 p
∗ + νF2 p
∗, implying
p∗ = a/(1 + νF1 + ν
F
1 ). From Remark 1, we also know that the slopes of the
equilibrium supply functions, νF∗1 (F, γ
F ) and νF∗2 (F, γ
F ), are higher if γF = 1
than if γF = 0, irrespective of the value of F . So, for all F it is true that
the equilibrium price p∗ = 1/(a + νF∗1 (F, γ
F ) + νF∗1 (F, γ
F )) will be lower if
γF = 1 than if γF = 0. Consequently, the equilibrium demand D(p∗) and the
equilibrium industry supply Q∗ = SF1 (p
∗) + SF2 (p
∗), which must be equal to
each other, will be higher if γF = 1. Since the resulting consumers’ surplus,
(Q∗)2/2, is increasing in Q∗ and thereby increasing in γF , it follows that
consumers’ surplus is always higher under fixed fee licensing, irrespective of
the fee, than under no licensing. 
By Remark 1, the equilibrium supply functions of both firms have always
higher slopes under fixed fee licensing than under no licensing. Given a fixed
demand curve, the positive effect of fixed fee licensing on supply functions
results in smaller equilibrium prices, and consequently in higher industry
output and consumers’ surplus.
Whether consumers also (always) prefer royalty licensing to no licensing
is not easy to answer. The reason is that the royalty rate affects the equi-
librium industry output in an ambiguous way. However, we can obtain an
immediate result using Proposition 6. Since the equilibrium supply function
chosen by any firm under fixed fee licensing is the same as it would be chosen
18
under royalty licensing with r = 0, Proposition 6, along with the continu-
ity of supply functions and profit functions, implies a welfare comparison at
sufficiently small rates of royalty.
Let r̂ denote a maximal threshold for r below which the industry supply
curve is always steeper under royalty licensing than under fixed fee licensing;
i.e.,









νF∗i (0, 1) for all r
′ ≤ r}. (45)




i (r, 1) is continuous in r ∈ [0, 1] and ν
R∗
i (0, 1) =
νF∗i (F, 1) > ν
F∗
i (F, 0) = ν
F∗
i (0, 0) for all F ∈ R+ and i ∈ {1, 2}. This leads
to the following result.
Corollary 1. If the equilibrium royalty rate r∗ is such that firm 2 buys the
license and r∗ ≤ r̂, then the equilibrium industry output and consumers’ sur-
plus are always higher under royalty licensing than they would be under no
licensing.
According to (33), royalty licensing is observed if and only if r∗ = r̄
and ∆πR∗1 (r
∗) ≥ 0, i.e., firm 1 prefers royalty licensing to the option of no
licensing. If firm 2 buys the license, then r∗ must be r̄ ensuring zero profit to
firm 2, i.e., ∆πR∗2 (r̄) = 0. So, Corollary 1 says that if the optimal royalty rate
r∗ chosen by firm 1 is such that ∆πR∗2 (r
∗) = 0, ∆πR∗1 (r
∗) ≥ 0, and r∗ ≤ r̂,
then the equilibrium of the royalty licensing game leads to higher industry
output and consumers’ surplus than the supply function equilibrium with no
licensing.
In the absence of any fee or royalty, firm 1 would become worse off under
licensing, i.e., ∆πF∗1 (0) < 0, as it would lose its cost advantage over firm
2. Oppositely, firm 2 would become better off, i.e., ∆πF∗2 (0) > 0, if it had
free access to the superior technology invented by firm 1. In order for any
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arrangement of licensing to take place, the necessary condition is that licens-
ing must be bilaterally beneficial when it is free; i.e., its benefit to firm 2 in
terms of additional profits due to lower costs must exceed its cost to firm 1
in terms of lost profits due to sharing its invention. Below, we will see that
this industry-wide net benefit of licensing depends on how large the cost ad-
vantage x of firm 1 is with respect to the common cost parameter θ. First
let us write ∆πF∗i (F ) as ∆π
F∗
i (F, θ, x) for any i = 1, 2, F ∈ R+, θ ∈ (0, a),
and x ∈ [0, θ].
Assumption 1. Given the cost parameter θ, the cost advantage x of firm 1
is such that ∆πF∗1 (0, θ, x) + ∆π
F∗
2 (0, θ, x) ≥ 0.
The above assumption ensures that if the license is free, the industry
profits are higher when firm 1 shares its invention with firm 2 than when
firm 1 keeps it to itself. If this assumption holds, firm 1 and firm 2 can
always reach a bilaterally beneficial allocation under fixed fee licensing while
the amount of fixed fee would affect the welfares of the two firms but not
their production levels.
Let us define a threshold value x̄(θ) such that Assumption 1 holds if and
only if x ≤ x̄(θ); i.e.,
x̄(θ) = inf
{




∆πF∗i (0, θ, x
′) < 0 if and only if x′ > x
}
.(46)
Unfortunately, we cannot explicitly calculate x̄(θ) analytically because of
the complexity of our problem. However, computer calculations illustrated
in Figure 2 reveal that x̄(θ)/θ has a unique graph (independent of the demand
size parameter a) and moreover it is increasing in θ and it never exceeds θ.
With these observations Figure 2 shows that there are situations in which
Assumption 1 holds as well as situations in which it does not.
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Figure 2. Region of Bilateral Benefits.
In our setup, firm 1 is assumed to have the ability to make a take-it-
or-leave-it offer to firm 2, allowing firm 1 to fully exploit all the benefits of
licensing. Under fixed fee licensing, firm 1 achieves this by demanding from
firm 2 the highest agreeable fee of F ∗ = ∆πF∗2 (0, θ, x). Therefore Assumption
1 is also sufficient for the license to be sold under fixed fee licensing. But
this is not true in the case of royalty licensing, since the equilibrium royalty
rate r∗ is always positive as shown by (33). Thus, two firms engage in roy-
alty licensing with the equilibrium royalty rate r∗ if and only if the induced
industry-wide net benefit is positive; i.e., ∆πR∗1 (r
∗, θ, x)+∆πR∗2 (r
∗, θ, x) ≥ 0.
In order to answer whether or not this condition holds, we have to find how
the function ∆πR∗1 (r, θ, x) + ∆π
R∗
2 (r, θ, x) behaves with respect to r.
Proposition 7. A change in the royalty rate r affects the supply functions of
firms in opposite directions: The slope νR∗1 (r, 1) is decreasing, while ν
R∗
2 (r, 1)
is increasing, in r.
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Proof. Recall that when γR = 1, θR2 = θ1 = θ − x. Differentiating (9) with



























b21 − 4a1c1 − b1
)
−8θ1(2+θ1).
Note that Γ < 0 if and only if
√
b21 − 4a1c1 < b1 + 4(2 + θ1) or equivalently
if and only if ψ ≡ a1c1 + 2(2 + θ1)b1 + 4(2 + θ1)
2 is positive. Inserting a1, b1,














which simplifies to ψ = 4(1 − r)θ1 + θ
3
1 + 16 + 16θ1 + 8θ
2
1, which is always
positive since r ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, ∂ νR∗1 (r, 1)/∂r < 0.






















































































Since νR∗2 , b2, and a2 are all positive, ∂ ν
∗
2(r, 1)/∂r > 0. 
Note that under royalty licensing the equilibrium price in equation (5)
can be rewritten as
pR∗(r, γR) =
a
1 + ν∗1(r, γ
R) + ν∗2(r, γ
R)
. (47)
To find the effect of r on pR∗(r, 1) we need to find its effect on νR∗1 (r, 1) +
νR∗2 (r, 1). This second effect cannot be obtained with the help of Proposition
7 where we show that νR∗1 (r, 1) and ν
R∗
2 (r, 1) move in opposite directions as
r changes. However, we can characterize a necessary and sufficient condition
under which the effect of r on νR∗1 (r, 1) dominates the effect on ν
R∗
2 (r, 1).
Lemma 1. The slope of the industry supply curve, νR∗1 (r, 1) + ν
R∗
2 (r, 1), is
increasing in r if and only if this slope is less than (νR∗2 (r, 1))
2 − 1.




1 (r, 1) and
νR∗2 = ν
R∗
2 (r, 1). Taking the logarithm of equation (25) when γ
R = 1, we
obtain






1− 2r + (θ − x)(1 + νR∗1 )
)
.






































































2 )/∂ r > 0 if and





2 − 1. 
Now, define for each θ and x the largest threshold r̂(θ, x) ∈ [0, 1] under








R̂(θ, x) = {r ∈ [0, 1] : νR∗1 (r
′)+νR∗2 (r
′) < (νR∗2 (r
′))2−1 for all r′ ≤ r}.(49)
Using the threshold r̂(θ, x) we can propose the following sufficiency result.
Proposition 8. The output of firm 2 and the industry output as well as
consumers’ surplus are higher, whereas the output of firm 1 is lower, under
royalty licensing than under fixed fee licensing if the equilibrium royalty rate
r∗ is less than r̂(θ, x).
Proof. Assume r∗ < r̂(θ, x). Then by equation (33), we must have r∗ = r̄.
Therefore, r̄ < r̂(θ, x). By Lemma 1 and equations (48)-(49), we have
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∂(νR∗1 (r, 1) + ν
R∗
2 (r, 1))/∂ r > 0 for all r < r̂(θ, x). So, ν
R∗
1 (r̄, 1) + ν
R∗
2 (r̄, 1) >
νR∗1 (0, 1) + ν
R∗
2 (0, 1). Equation (5) implies that p
R∗(r̄) < pR∗(0̄). Therefore,
D(pR∗(r̄)) > D(pR∗(0̄)), since the functionD is downward sloping by assump-
tion. By market clearing conditions we can replace the demand at each side of
the previous inequality by the industry supply, yielding QR∗ = SR1 (p
R∗(r̄)) +
SR2 (p
R∗(r̄)) > SR1 (p
R∗(0))+SR2 (p
R∗(0)) = QF∗. Then, it follows that CSR∗ =
(QR∗)2/2 > (QF∗)2/2 = CSF∗. Thus, the equilibrium industry output and
consumers’ surplus are both higher under royalty licensing than under fixed
fee licensing. Also, note that Proposition 7 implies that νR∗1 (r̄, 1) < ν
R∗
1 (0, 1)
and νR∗2 (r̄, 1) > ν
R∗
1 (0, 1). Since we already found that p
R∗(r̄) < pR∗(0̄), it
must be true that QR∗1 = p
R∗(r̄)νR∗1 (r̄, 1) < p
R∗(0)νR∗1 (0) = Q
F∗
1 . As we







F∗, we must have
QR∗2 > Q
F∗
2 . Thus, we have established that the output of firm 1 is lower
and the output of firm 2 is higher under royalty licensing than under fixed
fee licensing. 
Note from equation (33) that the equilibrium royalty rate r∗ can be less
than r̂(θ, x) only if r∗ = r̄ and that is the case if ∆πR∗1 (r̄) ≥ 0. So, the suffi-
ciency condition in Proposition 8 holds only if r̄ < r̂(θ, x) and ∆πR∗1 (r̄) ≥ 0.
We should also note that Propositions 6 and 8 together enable consumers to
fully rank royalty licensing, fixed fee-licensing, and no licensing. No licensing
is always inferior to fixed fee licensing, whereas fixed fee licensing is inferior
to royalty licensing if the royalty rate is sufficiently small; i.e., r∗ < r̂(θ, x).
Our results have also implications on the equilibrium profit of firm 1.
As the licensing contract is offered by firm 1, it ensures maximizing its own
profit by setting a royalty rate under which the equilibrium profit of firm 2
is the same as it would obtain under the equilibrium of fixed fee licensing.
Therefore, firm 2 is indifferent between the two forms of license that can be
offered by firm 1. Moreover, in the region of bilateral benefits (defined by
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Assumption 1) the industry profits are higher under fixed fee licensing than
under no licensing. Given the aforementioned indifference of firm 2, it is
clear that firm 1 prefers fixed fee licensing to no licensing when the size of
its cost advantage, x, is sufficiently low with respect to θ. It should also be
clear that firm 1 can never be worse under royalty licensing than under no
licensing since it has always the option of not selling its license by demanding
an unacceptable rate of royalty.
What our previous results are missing is a ranking on the equilibrium
profits of firm 1 under royalty licensing and fixed fee licensing. To identify
this ranking, let us define a threshold x̂(θ) below which firm 1 always prefers
royalty licensing to fixed fee licensing, i.e.,
x̂(θ) = max{x ∈ (0, θ] : πR∗1 (r
∗, θ, x′) ≥ πF∗1 (F
∗, θ, x′) for all x′ ≤ x}.(50)
Using computer calculations, we illustrate in Figure 3 the graph of x̂(θ)/θ
for values of θ ∈ [0, 10].
























Figure 3. Preferences of Firm 1 on Licensing Arrangements.
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Note that the dark blue curve, x̄(θ)/θ, in Figure 3 draws the bound-
ary of the region in which Assumption 1 holds and firm 1 strictly prefers
fixed fee licensing to no licensing (as already illustrated in Figure 2). More-
over, under the dark-blue curve, fixed fee licensing always yields higher con-
sumers’ surplus and social welfare than royalty licensing. That is, for any
(θ, x) such that x < x̄(θ) we have ∆πF∗1 (0, θ, x) > 0, ∆π
F∗
2 (0, θ, x) = 0,
CSF∗(0, θ, x) > CSR∗(0, θ, x), and SW F∗(0, θ, x) > SWR∗(0, θ, x). We also
find that the dark-blue and light-blue curves can together characterize the
preference relation of firm 1 on two licensing forms. In the dark-blue-shaded
region, fixed fee licensing is more profitable for firm 1 whereas in the light-
blue-shaded region, royalty licensing becomes more profitable.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have dealt with the problem of licensing in a duopoly under
supply function competition and studied the welfare effects of fixed fee licens-
ing and royalty licensing in comparison with each other and with the case of
no licensing. We have shown that the innovator firm may find it profitable to
sell the license for its cost-reducing technology (by a take-it-or-leave-it con-
tract) only if the size of its cost advantage is sufficiently low. Moreover, if the
innovator finds fixed fee licensing more profitable than no licensing and sells
its technology accordingly, then the equilibrium outputs of both firms and
consequently the equilibrium industry output (which are all independent of
the license fee) become higher than what could be attained in the absence of
licensing. This also implies that consumers always prefer fixed fee licensing
to the option of no licensing.
For royalty licensing, our results are more involving. The reason is that
the equilibrium supply functions, hence the equilibrium output, of firms are
not independent of the royalty rate like they are from the fixed fee. How-
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ever, since in the extreme case where the royalty rate is zero, royalty licens-
ing induces the same output allocations as in case of fixed fee licensing, we
know that the welfare results under both arrangements of licensing must be
the same in the limit. That is, if the equilibrium royalty rate is extremely
small then the equilibrium industry output and consumers’ surplus are always
higher under royalty licensing (too) than they would be under no licensing.
However, if the equilibrium royalty rate is not sufficiently low, then welfare
analyses under two arrangements of licensing become independent. In this
case, we can show that the royalty rate affects the equilibrium supply func-
tions and outputs of the two firms in opposite directions. As a matter of fact,
we find the effects to be negative for the innovator and positive for its rival.
Given this conflict, the effect of the royalty rate on the equilibrium industry
supply function, or output, becomes in general ambiguous. However, this
ambiguity disappears if the equilibrium royalty rate is not very high.
Finally, we show that we can Pareto rank the two arrangements of li-
censing by the help of two distinct thresholds, x̂ and x̄ with x̂ < x̄, that we
put on the cost advantage of the inventor. Since in our model, the license
contracts are always made by the innovator, independent of the licensed cost
advantage the licensee is enforced under any arrangement of licensing to en-
joy the same profit it would obtain under no licensing. Therefore, the licensee
is indifferent between any arrangement of licensing and no licensing at all.
On the other hand, the profit comparisons of the licensor is sensitive to the
size of its cost advantage. The licensor prefers any arrangement of licensing
to no licensing if and only if its cost advantage is smaller than the highest
threshold value x̄. Moreover, it prefers fixed fee licensing to royalty licensing
if its cost advantage is mild; i.e., it falls in between the two thresholds x̂ and
x̄. Finally, the licensor prefers royalty licensing to fixed fee licensing if its
cost advantage is below the lowest of the thresholds; i.e., x̂.
We should note that our results are different from the earlier findings in
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the literature where royalty licensing is preferred to fixed fee licensing by
the innovator producer under Cournot competition (Wang 1998), Bertrand
competition (Wang and Yang 1999), and Stackelberg competition (Filippini
2005). In contrast, we find that neither royalty nor fixed fee licensing is
always superior for the innovator, whose preference on these arrangements
depends on the size of its innovated cost advantage relative to the cost of its
rival.
Although we have restricted ourselves to the case where licensing con-
tracts are offered by the innovator entitling it to the whole producer benefit
from licensing, one can also consider other forms of contracts by introducing a
(non-dictatorial) cooperative or non-cooperative bargaining process between
the duopolists. Future research may also study whether our results are robust
with respect to the presence of asymmetric information, moral hazard prob-
lem, product differentiation, risk aversion, and strategic delegation among
many other directions.
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